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Recently, the development of a new land-based inter- 
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) system that could 
survive a nuclear attack has been investigated by the US.lv4 
This new missile system was to be called ‘MX’ for missile 
experimental. Since the MX system was proposed, several 
basing modes have been considered. Some of these systems 
include: deep underground basing, continuous airborne 
basing, mobile missile systems, launch under attack system, 
small submarine basing, surface ship basing, closely spaced 
basing and multiple protective shelter (MPS) basing, Of 
these options the MPS basing system has been seriously 
considered for possible future development. This paper 
analyses this MPS MX missile system mathematically. 
A model is developed which determines the cost optimal 
design of the system under varying conditions. In light of 
the fact that many components of this system have never 
been built before and the enemy’s capabilities are hard to 
predict, parametric analysis is carried out to understand 
more about the system design. 
System description and problem definition 
The MPS MX missile system has several major features: 
the missiles would be deployed in protective shelters, hard 
enough to protect them from attacks on adjacent shelters; 
the shelters would be spaced in a linear grid pattern and 
positioned to form the vertices of a hexagon (Figure I). 
This hexagonal array is the pattern that would minimize 
land area, while maximizing the number of warheads that 
must be expended to destroy the shelters. The shelters 
would be constructed together in connected groups called 
‘clusters’. Figure 1 shows two such clusters arranged 
linearly and each containing 23 shelters. Only one shelter 
chosen randomly within a cluster would house the actual 
missile, while the remaining shelters would house decoys, 
engineered to be indistinguishable from the actual MX 
missile. 
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As a further precaution to ensure that the locations of 
the actual missiles remained undetected, a specially 
designed transporter would shuffle the missiles and decoys 
deceptively about the shelters within a cluster. The missile 
transporter is an extremely large manned vehicle weighing 
approximately 300000 lb, and when fully loaded it would 
have weighed 1.6 million lb. The shelters within a cluster 
would be connected by heavy duty roads capable of sup- 
porting the weight of the transporter. Each cluster would 
have one missile transporter and one missile maintenance 
facility for the exclusive use of that cluster. Physical 
barriers would be constructed between clusters to ensure 
that additional missiles could not be brought into the 
cluster, primarily due to treaty considerations. Viewing 
ports would be installed on the shelters to allow for satellite 
observation. Hence, if the MX system were designed to be 
verifiable, it was thought that an opponent would be less 
likely to build an unverifiable missile system. 
The MX missile designed for the MPS system is the most 
accurate and powerful missile that the United States has 
ever built. The MX is a MIRV (Multiply Independently- 
targeted Re-enty Vehicle) missile with 10 separate’300 kilo- 
ton warheads with plans to increase the warhead yield to 
1 megaton each. The unratified SALT 3 Treaty specifies 
that 10 warheads are the maximum number of MIRV war- 
heads a missile can carry. 
The objective of the system is for the equivalent of 
approximately 1000 nuclear warheads to survive a hypo- 
thetical nuclear attack; it is the US Government’s estimate 
that about this number would be needed to destroy remain- 
ing enemy missiles.3,4 Also it is assumed that a combined 
strength of 2700 warheads would be targeted at the MX 
system. 
The proposed MPS MX missile system would have been 
an immense project. The entire system was conservatively 
projected to cost approximately $40 billion (1980 dollars), 
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Figure 1 Cluster layout3 
with some cost estimates as high as $100 billion.4p5 The 
problem addressed here is to determine the number of 
clusters (or the number of missiles as there is only one 
missile per cluster) in the MPS MX system, the number of 
shelters per cluster, the uniform distance between shelters 
and the hardness of shelters to meet the requirement of 
having 1000 warheads survive the nuclear attack at mini- 
mum cost. Cost considerations are important in the design 
of the system because of its excessive requirement both in 
design and maintenance. Consider, for instance, the con- 
struction of shelters. To avoid more than one shelter being 
destroyed by a single warhead either shelters have to have 
excessive hardness or they have to be far apart. The first 
alternative increases the cost of construction while the 
second alternative increases the cost of transportation 
thereby requiring a cost-effective determination of both 
the hardness of shelters, and the distance between them. 
Mathematical model 
The notation used to develop the model and the parameter 
values used in the initial analysis are given in the Appendix. 
The mathematical model is as follows: 
minimize: X1(& + CT + CL + C,) + C,(Xs -XI) 
+ 2300X2X, + C,X, X,(2 + fl 
+ C, r~(0.643Xs)~X~ + CeX, 
s.t. 100X2 -XIX2 + 0.85NSXr G 0 (1) 
3.5 x 1or2 
x4 2 
(x3/2>3 
(2) 
Xr>lOO (3) 
x2 > 100 (4) 
xr-XZGO (5) 
0 < X, < 600 (6) 
5000 f x3 < 10 000 (7) 
Details of the development of this model are given in 
Mishins.6 The objective function includes the total cost 
of missiles, launchers, maintenance facilities and trans- 
porters, the construction cost of shelters, the total cost 
of road network, the total cost of land and the total 
operating cost. The land on which the proposed missile 
system would have been constructed is owned by the 
US Government and would not have been an explicit 
expense of the missile system. However, the land is essen- 
tially unavailable for other purposes and an opportunity 
cost was therefore contributed to it. Constraint (1) 
represents the required number of warheads surviving the 
attack. (A missile is assumed to have 10 warheads.) This 
constraint is developed based on the accuracy and the 
reliability of enemy missiles. The accuracy of a missile is 
traditionally measured by the circular error probable (CEP) 
and the reliability was assumed to be 0.85.3 Constraint (2) 
relates the hardness of the shelters to the distance between 
them depending on the peak overpressure caused by the 
atomic blast. Constraints (3) and (4) represent the missiles’ 
survivability requirements. The fact that the number of 
missiles must be less than or equal to the number of shelters 
gives rise to constraint (5) while the maximum achievable 
hardness of shelters is captured in constraint (6). As the 
electromagnetic effects of a nuclear blast could damage the 
MX missile the distance between shelters should not be less 
than 5000 ft as given by (7). An upper bound of 10 000 ft 
is arbitrarily imposed to conserve the amount of land used. 
This is a nonlinear program involving several inear 
constraints. The following is the solution obtained using 
this model. 
Results 
The model was solved using CONMIN, a FORTRAN-based 
computer program developed at NASA.7 CONMIN is based 
on Zoutendijk’s method of feasible directions’s and was 
found suitable for the model on hand. The model does not 
satisfy convexity properties and hence the program guar- 
antees only local optimal solutions. Also, this program 
provides real valued solutions. The variables X1 and Xz 
are better represented as integer variables because of the 
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and the shelter hardness (X,) remained unchanged from the 
original solution. Typically, missile reliability is thought to 
be between 0.8 and 0.9.3 The parameter epresenting the 
reliability of enemy missiles was arbitrarily increased from 
0.8. The MX system cost increased linearly with the 
increase in the reliability of enemy missiles. For a 0.05 
increase in their reliability, the system cost increased by 
approximately $1 billion. 
Consider next the parameter epresenting the cost of 
each MX missile. The MX missile is currently under 
development and the costs are escalating. Furthermore, 
the original cost estimate does not include the cost of the 
10 nuclear warheads that each MX missile would carry. 
(The cost of warheads is classified.) The system cost was 
found to vary nonlinearly with the increase in the cost of 
each MX. The missile : shelter ratio varied over the range 
of the MX missile cost considered. When the cost of each 
MX missile is approximately $26 million, the number of 
MX missiles is 266, and there must be 11 shelters (approxi- 
mately) added to the system to compensate for each MX 
missile removed from the system. When the cost of each 
MX missile is approximately $46 million, the number of 
missiles is 253, and there must be 15 shelters added to the 
system to compensate for each missile removed from the 
system. 
The life cycle operating costs for the proposed MPS MX 
missile system would have been several billion dollars, the 
major portion of this being probably due to the security 
and maintenance of the shelters, missiles and the missile 
transporter vehicles. The estimated life cycle operating 
costs obtained from available reference sources did not 
provide sufficient detail of the data to break down the 
expected operating costs. It was assumed for the initial 
analysis that the operating costs were due entirely to the 
shelters. The total estimated operating costs were linearly 
scaled and added to the shelter cost. The life cycle oper- 
ating costs of the MX missiles could be quite significant. 
Hence, a sensitivity analysis was performed on the sub- 
division of the operating costs into percentages attribut- 
able to the missile and shelter costs. The model was found 
to be sensitive with regard to the subdivision of operating 
costs. The system cost decreased nonlinearly with increase 
in the percentage of operating costs attributable to the 
shelters. 
As mentioned earlier, the shelter construction cost is 
a function of the shelter hardness (X4). Due to a lack of 
data, a linear function was assumed for the initial analysis. 
An infinite number of exponential functions can, however, 
be fitted through the obtained data. It was assumed for this 
sensitivity analysis that each shelter has a fixed set-up 
cost of $100 000. By trial and error, two exponential 
functions were obtained to approximate the shelter con- 
struction cost. The exponential cost functions had virtually 
no effect on the solution obtained from the original 
analysis. However, the system cost decreased slightly from 
the original analysis due to the obviously decreased cost 
of shelter construction. 
discrete quantities they represent. A direct search routine 
OPT was written to find the best integer solutions around 
the solutions obtained by CONMIN. OPT6 was also used to 
search for a global optimal solution. Both the programs 
were executed on an AMDAHL 470 V/6-11 computer. The 
execution time of CONMIN required less than a second of 
total CPU time. 
Several starting points were chosen to search for this 
global optimal solution. Table 1 presents the values of 
decision variables for the optimal system design obtained 
by this analysis and the system as proposed by the US Air 
Force.3,4 The Air Force-proposed system would have a 
shelter: missile ratio of 23 : 1. The shelter hardness would 
be at an upper bound (600 psi) and the shelters would be 
spaced at 5200 ft intervals. Results of this analysis indicate 
a shelter : missile ratio of 14 : 1 to be near optimal. The 
optimal system design would incorporate a shelter hardness 
of 224 psi, and the shelters would be spaced at 5001 ft 
intervals. When the solution vector of the Air Force was 
used in the model developed for this analysis the cost 
estimates were quite similar (see Table I) and the Air Force 
solution was determined not to be a local minimum. This 
result is a possible indication of the validity and accuracy 
of the model developed for the analysis. The cost differ- 
ential between the solution obtained by the analysis and 
that proposed by the US Air Force is about $7 billion. 
Parametric analysis 
Many of the components designed for the proposed MPS 
MX missile system have never been built previously. For 
example, the missile transporter vehicle and the missile 
simulators are unique to this system. The cost estimates of 
many system components are only rough estimates, and 
the parameters representing these costs are net known with 
certainty. Furthermore, the reliability and number of 
adversary’s warheads (missiles) are difficult to predict with 
any degree of certainty. The optimal solution given in the 
previous section is based on the parameter values listed in 
the Appendix. Next, the effect of changing important 
parameter values on the solution is shown. More details can 
be found in Mishins.6 
Consider first the parameters representing the number 
and reliability of enemy missiles. The number of warheads 
that could be targeted at the system is currently not limited 
by any pending treaty. Within the range of the data 
analysed the system cost increased linearly with increase in 
the number of enemy missiles. The solution is particularly 
sensitive to the potential number of warheads targeted at 
the system. As expected, the number of MX missiles (X1) 
and shelters (X,) increased as the number of enemy missiles 
increased: however, the distance between shelters (X3) 
Tab/e I Optimal solution and its comparison with USAF solution 
Solution vector 
Objective 
XI X, X, X, function 
shelters missiles distance hardness (billions) 
Optimal solu- 3678 266 5001 224 27.561 
tion for this 
analysis 
USAF analysis 4600 200 5200 600 34.307 
This analysis 4600 200 5200 600 33.648 
with USAF 
solution vector 
Conclusions 
A model has been developed to represent he MPS MX 
missile system. The model can be used to design the 
system as well as to study its performance. Parametric 
analysis was carried out and showed the sensitivity of the 
system design as parameter values varied over reasonable 
ranges. 
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Appendix 
Notation 
Decision 
variables 
Xl 
Variable representation 
Number of missiles in MX system 
x2 Number of shelters in MX system 
X3 Uniform distance between shelters (ft) 
x4 Shelter hardness (psi) 
Parameters and item values used for initial analysis 
Para- Parameter Value used 
meter representation in analysis Ref. Page 
- 
cM 
CT 
CL 
CD 
CN 
co 
CA 
CB 
NS 
R 
- 
Cost of each MX 
missile 
Cost of each MX 
missile transporter 
Cost of each missile 
launcher 
Cost of simulated 
missile (decoy) 
Road construction 
and network costs/ 
mile 
Operating and sup- 
port costs/shelter 
Cost of land/sq ft 
Cost of each main- 
tenance facility 
Number of enemy 
missiles targeted at 
MX system 
Reliability of enemy 
missiles 
26 130 000* 3 86,96 
8 170000” 3 86,88 
(included in 3 
MX missile 
cost) 
527 500* 3 
2 000 ooo* * 3 89 
1400000* 3 
$0 3 64,65,73 
5 500000 9 33 
2700 3 
0.85 3 
96 
86 
97 
44 
41 
* Linearly scaled from total estimates 
** Estimated. OTA claims that $4.5 billion can be saved in costs 
if 2300 shelters are backfilled. This eliminates most of the network 
and road costs 
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